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摘  要 
















































































As is shown in the statistics from 1999 to 2004 provided by Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, there were nearly 150 listed companies that had been investigated and 
punished by Shanghai Stock Exchange and China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
because of inaccurate performance prediction, mendacious accounting information, 
misleading statements, delayed disclosure of changes in companies, changes made 
randomly in accounting policy for profitability. Overflowing accounting information 
dramatically hurt numerous Chinese investors’ trust and their basic rights, hampered 
the healthy and orderly development of Chinese capital market, and made the key 
information transmission media in capital market economic---accounting information 
questioned by numerous investors.  
  Though at the beginning of 21st century, there also exploded rather serious 
accounting scandal in America, involving lots of internationally-known enterprises 
and the five accounting firms, it was not too late for the U.S. government to take 
actions. It past “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” immediately, and increased the independency of 
certificated accountants and the internal control ability within companies. While the 
conclusion could not be reached that the quality of American accounting information 
got improved after that, it is shown in the thesis by Chinese experts that they basically 
hold positive altitude towards “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and the quality of American 
accounting information, and especially pretty trusty altitude towards the quality of 
accounting information in these listed companies. Just as Mr. Ge Jiapeng said, a 
well-known accounting scholar, “the high quality of American accounting information 
does not mean that there is no mendacious accounting information in the U.S., but 
that the amount and degree of the mendacious accounting information have not 
affected people’s trust in the financial information yet.”  
Through comparing the legal difference between China and America, the 
difference in the quality of accounting information in these two countries will be 
explored and explained. And the clue lies in their different benefit-cost curves. 
Through legal perspective, this thesis focuses on revealing the fact that the cost of 
making mendacious accounting information in China is much lower than that in the 
U.S.  All rational certificated accountants are not morally noble, but they think in 















in such kind of business. Conversely, driven by profit, some accountants will ignore 
their social responsibilities and fabricate mendacious accounting information.  
 Illegal cost should lie on the product of the frequency of accountants’ 
misbehavior being disclosed and of their being punished, as well the strength of 
punishment. This thesis develops closely around this thinking. The second chapter 
mainly analyzes every factor that constitutes the illegal cost, examines closely the 
frequency of accountants’ misbehavior being revealed, and elaborately analyzes 
media’s supervision on account information quality, and utilizes legal means to 
promote the individuality of media for the purpose of enhancing its supervision on 
account information quality. 
  Based on American regulation, legal resolutions to improve the quality of 
accounting information in China are brought forward in the fourth chapter. Namely, 
first, increase illegal Cost; second, to increase the frequency of their misbehavior 
being exposed, establish the freedom of press by legal means.    
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美国财务会计准则委员会（Financial Accounting Standards Board，以下简称
为：FASB）在《会计信息质量特征》中描述了可靠性和相关性这两个 基本的
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